CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	USSR	<u></u>					REPORT	NO.	Γ				
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	regard to the Western powers. The fully to Stalin's thesis and Malen 19th Party Congress.	new shifts in Malenkov's kov's own thesis announce	s policy conform ed during the
4. 25X1	The reasons which probably influent during Stalin's lifetime were provous problems and in part by foreign positions made in this report are correlated that his policy of keeping harassment, instead of causing the it. The very serious problems whithe German question between France arising out of the US-British diff world influence, many other proble USSR could use to divide the West, the face of the cold war promoted Saar question, Britain forgot or period markets, France allowed the US to Australia and the Philippines access this was possible because the West defend itself from probable Soviet the US invested billions of dollar that had alighed themselves with the Soviet threat. Their error with regard to the cold they had decided to shift to this disintegration of the West.	ided in part by Soviet de clicy problems (assuming sect). It appears that Significant to the West constantly in a character of the West to disintegrate, as character of the constant to the western problems in Europe and the Far all this became of second by the Soviet Union. The cretended to forget US combuild military bases in its primary problem was the same of aggression. For the Soviet leads and we the Soviet leads was even before Stalin decrease.	omestic policy that the supposi- talin had come to a state of alarm and ctually had unified owers (for example, owers), the problems th the question of East, which the indary importance in the West forgot the impetition in her North Africa, rearmament, and all the necessity to this same reason, apons for the countries ality of war against aders had recognized s death, and that
5.	Another cause of Soviet preoccupat and China. The continuous and dra the USSR never succeeded in comple In past months there have been ver situation prevailing in many parts himself had decided to attach spec Soviet power in the USSR and in th	stic purges in the Satell tely taming the "Pepples' y evident signs of the m of the USSR itself. It ial importance during th	lites show that Democracies". Dre or less chaotic: appears that Stalin
6.	groups fighting among themselves f	or Stalin's succession.	In addition to
25X1	the official announcements that Zh causes (this has been denied offic are irrefutable proofs It is not known by whom he was purely Malenkov's men. The supposition Jewish doctors is not generally act that a few weeks after it was officione away with and after Stalin has the "assassins," Stalin himself disknown that he was Zhdanov's rival:	ielly only by the Malenko that Zhda ged, but now it appears to n that Zhdanov's death we ceptable, but it is now a cially announced that Zhd d ordered a large-scale is ed and Malenkov came to	ov government), there anov was purged. That he was purged as caused by the un historical fact lanov had been threstigation against power. (It is well
7.	Malenkov ordered the release and reand the arrest of their accusers, a honors and decorations of the USSR innocent, but that, despite their preventing light from being shed or immediately after Stalin's death, hat all constitutional) reshuffling	on whom Stalin had bestow It is probable that the innocence, Malenkov had en Zhdanov's death. It was Malenkov carried out a re	red the highest se doctors were every interest in se also noted that, dical (and not "
8.	Nothing in particular is known abou	ut differences between th	e USSR and China.
25X1	However, a serious misunderstanding between	in past mon	the there has been
25/1	war in Kores and the entire Asian t	policy. MAO Tse Tung's a Malenkov's appointment of flown that in a few days the	bsence at Moscow f V.V. Kuznetsov he Soviet and
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"peaceful coexistence" in Asia in an attempt to destroy politically (something that is not impossible) Chiang's Nationalist Government and become a UN member. It appears that MAO was not satisfied with the policy imposed on him by Stalin, a policy which called for Communist China to be "defended" and represented at international meetings by Soviet diplomats. Moreover, it is believed that at this time Malenkov does not wish to make an enemy of MAO and that he has promised to support Communist China's policy in exchange for Chinese promises of closer collaboration between Moscow and Peiping. However, we have learned that nothing specific has been decided thus far regarding close collaboration between Moscow and Peiping and that details of such a collaboration will be discussed during the weeks to come.

_	These reasons, both domestic and international in character
25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1	policy. For the same reasons, Malenkov is even more competited to change these tactics. Stalin had a myth in his favor. Malenkov, to strengthen his position, needs a long period of prudent domestic policy and very prudent foreign policy. For these reasons, the USSR and China to the West are substantially "peaceful" proposals made by the USSR and China to the West are substantially sincere and can be implemented at once, but that these proposals do not mean that Malenkov intends to deviate from the "Stalinist orthodoxy". He needs more than anyone else the myth of "leader" and needs also to continue throughout the Communist world the policy of the USSR as a "model state".
10. 25X1 25X1	It is also quite probable that, by extending his hand to the West, Malenkov hopes to draw the West into negotiations in which each of the participants would make some concessions to the other. Now, any obtained for the USSR would enhance his popularity and contribute to the creation of the Malenkov myth. While price reductions in the USSR enhance Malenkov's popularity at home, any concession that he can obtain in foreign policy will enhance his prestige not only on the domestic plane, but also on the Cominform international plane.
25X1 ₁₁ .	
25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1	Malenkov is not destroying Stalin's ideologies, but his governmental apparatus, to set up one of his Malenkov's own, and that he is striving also to create his own myth. This is something which cannot be accomplished in a year or two. However, the status of "operation Malenkov" cannot be determined at this time. At least a few months must pass before we can estimate the direction and world impact of the new Soviet leader's policy.

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